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Abstract In this paper we are concerned with how aggre-
gated outcomes of individual behaviours, during interactions
with other individuals (games) or with environmental fac-
tors, determine the vital rates constituting the growth rate of
the population. This approach needs additional elements,
namely the rates of event occurrence (interaction rates).
Interaction rates describe the distribution of the interaction
events in time, which seriously affects the population
dynamics, as is shown in this paper. This leads to the model
of a population of individuals playing different games, where
focal game affected by the considered trait can be extracted
from the general model, and the impact on the dynamics of
other events (which is not neutral) can be described by an
average background fertility and mortality. This leads to a
distinction between two types of background fitness, strate-
gically neutral elements of the focal games (correlated with
the focal game events) and the aggregated outcomes of other
interactions (independent of the focal game). The new
approach is useful for clarification of the biological meaning
of concepts such as weak selection. Results are illustrated by
a Hawk–Dove example.
Keywords Replicator dynamics  Evolutionary game 
Density dependence  Interaction rate  Eco evolutionary
feedback  Background fitness
Mathematics Subject Classification 91A22  92D15 
37C10
Introduction
The cornerstone of building scientific theories is the proper
choice of underlying terminology describing the objects
and processes of interest; the mathematical structures used
in the formalization of the theory can influence the
underlying language. A good example is the impact of
game theory on evolutionary theory, which has meant that
strategic reasoning is common in works related to evolu-
tion, even if they are not supported by mathematical
notions (Dawkins 1976; Williams 1996). However, the
basic evolutionary game theoretic framework is described
by abstract mathematical terms whose relations with
observable biological processes is often unclear. The most
influential concept, which is foundational for game theo-
retic methods in biology, is the game as a metaphor for the
individual interactions. In this paper we will investigate
how this aspect should be expressed in the context of the
ecological population dynamics.
The modern approaches to evolutionary game mod-
elling can essentially be divided into two classes. The first
contains static models (see e.g. Maynard Smith 1982;
Broom and Rychtar 2013), based on potentially compli-
cated payoff functions describing some abstract parameter
called ‘‘fitness’’, while the second contains dynamic
models based on replicator dynamics and simplified
(mostly matrix) payoff functions (Maynard Smith 1982;
Cressman et al. 1986; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988, 1998).
The first type is focused on the details of the interaction,
while population dynamics aspects are lacking. There are
no evolutionary processes in time, only causal outcomes of
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the particular interaction. Thus, while payoffs quantified
by obtained resources or energetic gain have a clear bio-
logical interpretation, the impact of the game outcomes on
the population state is not fully explained. In the second
case, the situation is the opposite: the interactions are not
explicitly depicted in the model but their outcomes are
phenomenologically described by the excess from the
average growth rate, and the dynamics of the selection
process is explicitly analysed. In addition, from game
theoretic methods have grown the field of adaptive
dynamics (Dieckmann and Law 1996; Metz et al. 1996;
Geritz et al. 1998; Dercole and Rinaldi 2008), focused on
the long-term evolution of continuous traits, driven by
mutations. This approach emphasises the importance of
ecological context.
To fill the gap between the two approaches to games and
investigate the ecological meaning of individual interactions
we should answer the question: How do the outcomes of
particular interactions affect the growth rates of the respec-
tive strategies? The methods related to game theory are also
used in life history theory (Caswell 2001) to describe the
competition between different life history strategies, but this
framework does not assume interactions between individu-
als. In this approach fitness components are described as the
vital rates (birth and death rates of the respective age or stage
classes). We can use this approach to solve the posed prob-
lem and establish the link between interaction rates,
describing the occurrence of the interaction events in time,
and resulting vital rates of respective types of interactions,
describing the changes of the population state. This question
is important not only for game theoretic models. It is related
to the problem of the general mathematical representation of
fitness (Metz 2008; Roff 2008; Orr 2009) and the method-
ological interpretation of this term, discussed by biologists
and philosophers of science (Mills and Beatty 1979;
Rosenberg and Williams 1986; Horan 1994; Matthen and
Ariew 2002; Brandon and Ramsey 2007; Matthen and Ariew
2009; Walsh 2010; Ramsey 2013).
State of the art. An event-based approach
This paper extends a novel approach to evolutionary games
from Argasinski and Broom (2012). This approach is
focused on ecological realism, falsifiability and a mecha-
nistic interpretation of the results obtained. The main goal
was to express individual fitness in terms of demographic
parameters. This allows us to describe the terms, such as
‘‘costs’’ and ‘‘benefits’’, by measurable parameters (mortal-
ity interpreted as the probability of death and fecundity
interpreted as the number of newborns obtained in effect
through an interaction) instead of an abstract, undefined
‘‘fitness’’ described by an infinitesimal rate of increase of the
population (or single component of fitness such as fecundity
as in Chakra et al. (2014), where the number of eggs laid
constitutes fitness). This is realized by the explicit applica-
tion of two payoff functions describing mortality and
fecundity counted in the currencies of births and deaths,
instead of one fitness function describing excess from the
mean Malthusian growth rate. This new approach can be
described as event-based because it describes cause and
effect chains of underlying interaction events. For example
mortality can act on adult individuals before or after repro-
duction, or the description of the structure of the interaction
event can be more complex.
In addition, this approach emphasises the role of density
dependence. The fertility payoff functions are not constant
in time but can be affected by selectively neutral juvenile
mortality leading to a more complex selection mechanism
induced by eco-evolutionary feedback (Hauert et al.
2006, 2008; Argasinski and Kozłowski 2008; Zhang and
Hui 2011; Argasinski and Broom 2012; Huang et al. 2015;
Gokhale and Hauert 2016). Thus the fertility reward can
decrease, due to the increase of the juvenile mortality,
below the adult mortality costs. Population size does not
converge to an arbitrary phenomenological carrying
capacity (constant, as in for example Cressman and Krˇivan
2010; Krˇivan 2013, or affected by payoffs, as in Novak
et al. 2013) as in many models, exploiting the classical
logistic growth, but to a dynamic equilibrium between all
mortality and fertility factors. A similar approach that can
be found in epidemiological models is called the emergent
carrying capacity (Bowers et al. 2003; Sieber et al. 2014).
This is more realistic and provides a mechanistic inter-
pretation in terms of demographic factors. The properties
of the selection mechanism, induced by strategically neu-
tral growth limitation, were analysed in Argasinski and
Broom (2013). Here at the population size equilibrium,
newborns form a pool of candidates from which survivors
which will replace dead adults at their nest sites will be
drawn; this was termed the nest site lottery.
Two research goals of the paper
(a) Role of event occurrence rates describing the dis-
tribution of interaction events in time: We will analyse
how the rates of event (or interaction) occurrence, associ-
ated with respective event-related mortality and fertility
payoffs, constitute the vital rates (rates of change of the
population state, Caswell 2001) driving the population
dynamics. However, the main difference between ecolog-
ical population dynamics and evolutionary game theory is
that population dynamics is focused on how the population
is shaped by different types of events (which can be
described by different types of games), while evolutionary
game theory generally analyses the selection of strategies
in a single particular type of event. Thus we should be able
34 Theory Biosci. (2018) 137:33–50
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to extract those focal interaction from our more complex
general model, with the remaining events generating the
corresponding background fitness. The application of event
occurrence rates (or interaction rates) for evolutionary
games was originated in Taylor and Nowak (2006). In their
paper different strategy carriers can interact at different
rates and thus can play different numbers of game rounds
(the differences with our approach, related to the definition
of fitness, are discussed in section ‘‘The event-based
approach and rates of event occurrence’’ in the Discussion.
(b) Classification of the types of background fitness:
Traditionally, background fitness has been modelled by a
phenomenological additive element of the payoff function
that vanishes under the replicator dynamics, with the associ-
ated dynamics being very simple. The growth rate is described
by a single payoff function and it is not clear whether back-
ground fitness is a neutral element of the payoff or a separate
factor acting at a different occurrence rate. Within classical
evolutionary game theory, which is density independent, both
approaches are equivalent and distinction between them is not
necessary. In addition there is no clear biological interpreta-
tion of this factor and it has rather been interpreted as a
technical element of mathematical notation. As was shown in
Argasinski and Broom (2012), background fitness compo-
nents can seriously affect the dynamics. However, the natural
interpretation of those factors can be provided by the approach
from point a). Thus, can we derive phenomenological neutral
elements as the aggregated outcomes of background events?
Results
In the coming sections we will introduce a number of
important terms used in our paper; a summary of these is
presented in Table 1.
The general model
Introduction of the rates of event occurrence
and derivation of the vital rates
Firstly, let us derive the general growth equation according
to the framework proposed in point (a) from ‘‘Two research
goals of the paper’’. We can consider multiple event types
which occur as independent Poisson processes. Then,
during a short time interval some number of events occur
and their outcomes change the state of the population
(newborns are introduced to the population and dead
individuals are removed, see Fig. 1).
The events of the i-th type occur at rate si (the super-
script describes the event type since later the subscript will
describe the strategy), where its outcomes are described by
respective fertility and mortality payoff functions Wi and
di, where Wi is the average number of newborns produced
and di is the probability of death during this type of
interaction event. If the i-th event type is a safe mating
opportunity then the respective death probability di equals
zero. On the other hand, if the event is not related to mating
or reproduction but is dangerous, then Wi ¼ 0. The general
growth equation thus has the following form:
_n ¼
X
i
nsi Wi  di : ð1Þ
Note that the parameters si do not have to be just technical
constants but can be functions of the population size or
strategic composition, as for example in the dynamic sex
ratio model as we discuss in ‘‘The event-based approach
and rates of event occurrence’’ in the Discussion (see
Argasinski 2012, 2013, 2017) or models of upstream
reciprocity (Nowak and Roch 2007; Pena et al. 2011). Thus
we can derive the per capita vital rates as products of the
event occurrence rates and the demographic outcomes of
events. Then siWi will be the fertility rate and sidi will be
the mortality rate for the i-th type of event. The sum of the
respective vital rates over all types of events will constitute
the crude mortality and fertility rates (Caswell 2001).
We will next apply the approach presented in this section
and summarized by Eq. (1) to obtain the evolutionary
dynamics framework centred on a particular focal game. We
will extract one particular type of event from our general
model to analyse the selection of individual strategies rela-
ted to that game. The aggregated impact of all other types of
events will constitute the background fitness.
Background fitness as the aggregated outcomes
of background events
Individuals enter an arbitrarily chosen focal game (with
payoffs WF and dF where auxiliary lower index F means
‘‘focal event’’) at rate sF as in Eq. (1), and engage in other
activities at rates described by siB; we can consider a single
class of all such activities, as we show below.
Each of the background events can be characterised by
outcomes which include a fertility WiB and mortality d
i
B
component (lower index B means ‘‘background event’’).
We can calculate the outcomes of the average background
event. WB ¼
P
i s
i
BW
i
B=sB is the average fertility per event
(where sB ¼
P
i s
i
B) and dB ¼
P
i s
i
Bd
i
B=sB is the average
death probability per event.
In effect ‘‘background events’’ occur at intensity sB and
individuals involved in those events obtain fertility WB on
average and survive with probability sB ¼ 1  dB. Then
Eq. (1) can be presented in the following form:
_n ¼ nsF WF  dFð Þ þ nsB WB  dBð Þ: ð2Þ
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Note that, since the focal game depends on the analysed
traits then the respective focal game payoffs will depend on
the strategic composition of the population. However, for
simplicity, the argument term (q) will not be included in the
numbered equations. Then the interaction rates multiplied by
demographic payoffs will constitute the ‘‘vital rates’’ (per
capita rates of change of the population state, see Caswell
2001). Now we can extend our model to the detailed
description of the evolutionary game including the different
strategies. Each strategy should be represented by its
respective equation of type (2) and assigned demographic
payoff functions WFðqÞ and dFðqÞ. We can use the structure
of the demographic payoff functions from Argasinski and
Broom (2012) (see ‘‘Appendix 1’’ for the necessary details)
Table 1 A list of important
symbols
Symbol Description
n Population size
Wi Fertility payoff function of the i-th type event
di Mortality payoff function of the i-th type event
K Carrying capacity (maximal environmental load)
qi Frequency of the i-th strategy
WiðqÞ Fertility payoff of the i-th strategy
siðqÞ Pre-reproductive survival payoff function of the i-th strategy
ViðqÞ Mortality-fertility trade-off function for the i-th strategy
si Rate of occurrence (intensity) of the i-th type event
sF Rate of occurrence (intensity) of the focal game event
sB Rate of occurrence of the background event
s Interaction rate from Argasinski and Broom (2012)—see ‘‘Appendix 1’’
h ¼ sB=sF Average number of background events between two focal events
Wb Focal game background fertility (payoff based approach)
db ¼ 1  sb focal game background post-reproductive mortality (payoff-based approach)
WB Average background event fertility (dynamics-based approach)
dB ¼ 1  sB Average background event mortality (dynamics-based approach)
U ¼ hWB Rate of the average background fertility
W ¼ hð1  sBÞ Rate of the average background mortality
S Hawk–Dove example survival payoff matrix
F ¼ WP Hawk–Dove example fertility payoff matrix
d ¼ 1  s Probability of death during a Hawk–Dove contest
~qhðnÞ Frequency nullcline describing the Nash equilibria
~nðqhÞ Density nullcline describing the ecological equilibria
Fig. 1 Schematic presentation
of the idea underlying the
proposed framework.
Interaction events occur at some
rate and the aggregation of their
demographic outcomes (births
and deaths) is responsible for
changes of the population state
36 Theory Biosci. (2018) 137:33–50
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allowing us to describe the mortality and fertility outcomes
of the elements of the causal chain underlying the single
interaction event. We limit ourselves to the simple trade-off
between a single pre-reproductive mortality stage and a
single fertility stage (this happens for example in mating
conflicts when males fight and the surviving winners can
mate; thus mortality acts before reproduction). For each
strategy WFðqÞ will be the mortality–fertility trade-off
function ViðqÞ ¼
P
j qjsiðejÞWiðejÞ describing the repro-
ductive success of the survivors of the mortality stage
described by survival payoff siðqÞ ¼ 1  diðqÞ (where index
i describes the strategy number) acting as 1  dFðqÞ. In
addition, we will include the density dependent juvenile
survival function ð1  n=KÞ to introduce the nest site lottery
mechanism (Argasinski and Broom 2013). Thus the general
growth equation for the i-th strategy will be as follows:
_ni ¼ nisFVi 1  n
K
 
 nisFð1  siÞ
þ nisBWB 1  n
K
 
 nisBdB:
ð3Þ
We can adjust the timescale to make the focal game’s vital
rates equal to their demographic payoffs. This will keep the
mechanistic interpretation of the payoffs as the number of
offspring and the survival probability during the interaction
event. It is clear that only the ratio of our two interaction
rates is important for the evolution of the population. After
a change of timescale ~t ¼ tsF , sF vanishes and sB trans-
forms into h ¼ sB
sF
. Note that letting sF tend to zero, i.e.
letting h tend to 1, implies the weak selection limit where
the impact of the focal game on the ecological dynamics
vanishes; thus the eco-evolutionary feedback is broken (see
‘‘Formulation of a Hawk-Dove game as an example’’. The
parameter h can be interpreted as the average number of
background events between two focal interactions. Then
the growth equation will be:
_ni ¼ ni Vi 1  n
K
 
 1  sið Þ þ h WB 1  n
K
 
 dB
 h i
;
ð4Þ
leading to the following equation for the population size:
_n ¼
X
i
_ni ¼ n
X
i
qiVi 1  n
K
 
 1 
X
i
qisi
 !"
þh WB 1  n
K
 
 dB
 i
:
ð5Þ
Parameters sB, WB and dB can be biologically justified and
can even be functions of other parameters (for example
from other types of game). However, if we need only some
background ‘‘noise’’ without particular justification, to add
realism to our model, we can simplify the notation. Since
demographic parameters WB and dB never occur without
the ratio between intensities h, we can simplify this by
substitutions U ¼ hWB and W ¼ hdB, constituting the
background vital rates. Letting qi ¼ ni=n, we obtain the
following system of replicator equations:
_qi ¼ qi Vi 
X
j
qjVj
 !
1  n
K
 
þ si 
X
j
qjsj
 !" #
;
ð6Þ
_n ¼ n Uþ
X
i
qiVi
 !
1  n
K
 
þ
X
i
qisi  1 W
" #
;
ð7Þ
where Eq. (7) follows directly from Eq. (5), and Eq. (6) is
obtained using Eqs. (4) and (5). The attractor of the pop-
ulation size is given by the nontrivial zero of the right-hand
side of Eq. (7), constituting the density nullcline:
~n ¼ 1 Wþ 1 
P
i qisi
UþPi qiVi
 
K: ð8Þ
This approach to the background fitness can be termed the
dynamics based approach since it is not related to the game
theoretic structure. Note that this approach is related to the
methodology used for the separation of ecological equa-
tions from selection dynamics (Cressman and Garay
2003a, b; Cressman et al. 2001). However, here we do not
want to separate the ecological dynamics from the selection
dynamics, since we believe that the relationship between
ecology and selection is extremely important.
Two distinct approaches to background fitness
The background fitness vital rates, representing the impact
of other games played by individuals, appear as the addi-
tive elements U 1  n
K
 
and W in Eq. (7). However, tradi-
tionally in evolutionary games, a background fitness is
represented by a background payoff which is the strategi-
cally neutral element of the payoff function (such as a
constant added to all entries of the payoff matrix). But in
our case, we have two separate payoffs described in distinct
units (numbers of births and probability of survival). The
question of whether the game theoretic background payoff
concept and the background fitness describing the impact
of the other games are equivalent arises. The impact on the
dynamics of the neutral elements of both payoff functions
is analysed in ‘‘Appendix 2’’. It is shown there that only
multiplicative pre-reproductive survival will be selectively
neutral and will affect only the pace of convergence.
Additive background fertility Wb and multiplicative post-
reproductive background survival sb (which was described
by m in Argasinski and Broom 2012) will appear together
in the multiplicative factor Wb 1  nK
 þ sb
 
of the sur-
vival payoffs si (this approach was used in Argasinski and
Theory Biosci. (2018) 137:33–50 37
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Broom 2012). Note that here we use the lower case sub-
script b for the neutral elements of the payoff functions
(that can be termed the payoff-based approach), to distin-
guish them from the payoffs from the alternative approach,
where we use B. The replicator dynamics will be
_qi ¼ qi Vi 
X
j
qjVj
 !
1  n
K
 "
þ Wb 1  n
K
 
þ sb
h i
si 
X
j
qjsj
 !#
;
ð9Þ
_n ¼ n
X
i
qiVi 1  n
K
 
þ Wb 1  n
K
 
þ sb
h iX
i
qisi  1
" #
;
ð10Þ
and then the manifold representing the population size
equilibria (the n -nullcline, which is the attractor in the n-
subspace) is
~n ¼ K 1  1  sb
P
i qisi
Wb
P
i qisi þ
P
i qiVi
 
: ð11Þ
The above equations show that the neutral elements of the
payoff functions produce different outcomes than the
dynamics-based background fitness U and W. However, the
payoff-based approach can be a valuable element of the the-
oretical framework. In particular, it can be used to describe the
selectively neutral elements linked with the game interaction
such as juvenile mortality (responsible for the nest site lottery
mechanism, Argasinski and Kozłowski 2008; Zhang and Hui
2011; Argasinski and Broom 2012, 2013). But it can be
problematic, if we want to use it when describing the impact of
other games, since it is an element of the causal chain of the
focal game. This can be done only in the case of the back-
ground post-reproductive mortalitydb ¼ 1  sb, which can be
linked with background mortality W by the relationship
described by Theorem 1 in ‘‘Appendix 2’’.
The difference between the two approaches relies on the
different distributions of events in time. In the dynamics-
based background fitness W all background deaths gradu-
ally aggregate according to the intensities of all other
games. In the payoff-based approach, all background
deaths occur at the same time with the focal interaction as
the last element of the causal chain (some survivors of the
game are killed). Theorem 1 (see ‘‘Appendix 2’’) shows
that this mortality can be interpreted as the aggregated
mortality between two focal game events.
If we limit analysis to the static case, then the interpretation
of the background fitness as the mortality between two focal
games is more natural and allows us to get rid of the instanta-
neous rates of occurrence from our reasoning. In addition this
allows us to remove the abstract terminology of differential
equations. In effect, the static reasoning can be expressed in
clear, intuitive and empirically measurable terms, describing
the respective causal stages of the interaction.
However, if we are interested in the dynamics, the dif-
ferences related to the different distribution of deaths in
time can seriously affect the predictions. This will be
illustrated in the next section.
Formulation of a Hawk–Dove game as an example
We will illustrate the results from ‘‘The general model’’ by
use of a Hawk–Dove example. Argasinski and Broom
(2012) considered the payoff matrices S (survival proba-
bility) and P, where the fertility matrix is F ¼ WP, below:
S =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
H D
H s 1
D 1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, P =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
H D
H 0.5 1
D 0 0.5
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Here s ¼ 1  d\1 is the survival probability of a fight
between Hawks, and the fertility matrix contains the
expected number of newborns W produced from the
interaction. This leads to the following set of replicator
equations (see ‘‘Appendix 3’’ for a detailed derivation):
_qh ¼ qh 1  qhð Þ
1
2
W 1  qhdð Þ 1  n
K
 
 qhd
 
; ð12Þ
_n ¼ n Uþ 1
2
W 1  q2hd
  
1  n
K
 
 q2hd W
 
;
ð13Þ
describes the Hawk frequencies and total population size.
The zeros of the right-hand sides of the above equations
will give nullclines constituting the equilibria of selection
and ecological subsystems. Two rest points of this system
are qh ¼ 0 and 1. A nontrivial rest point, which becomes
the attracting nullcline describing the manifold represent-
ing the strategic equilibria, is given by
~qhðnÞ ¼
1
2
W 1  n
K
 
d 1
2
W 1  n
K
 
þ 1
  : ð14Þ
There is a stable population size at either ~n ¼ 0 or at the
positive restpoint, which is conditional on the Hawk
strategy frequency (describing the nullcline constituting the
population size equilibrium manifold parametrized by qh),
~nðqhÞ ¼ K 1  q
2
hd þW
1
2
W 1  q2hd
 þ U
 !
: ð15Þ
Note that background fitness factors W 1  n
K
 
and U
affect the shape of the density nullcline. Numerical
38 Theory Biosci. (2018) 137:33–50
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simulations show that this impact can be significant. This is
illustrated by examples in Figs. 2, 3, 4, which differ only by
parameters U and W.
We see that when U and W are small as in Fig. 2, and to
a lesser extent in Fig. 3, the trajectory is clearly distinct
from the density nullcline ~nðqÞ, whereas for large U and W,
as in Fig. 4, the trajectory converges quickly to this null-
cline, and then follows it to the equilibrium point. Thus,
only for large U and W , i.e. in the weak selection limit, can
we obtain a separation of timescales for slow frequency
and fast size dynamics, which can be described by its
equilibrium value.
The shape of the density nullcline shows the strength of
the impact of the focal game, via eco-evolutionary feed-
back, on the ecology of the population. In Figs. 2 and 3,
where the focal game is quite a frequent event (since
Fig. 2 The dynamics of a Hawk–Dove population in our new model
with initial conditions qhð0Þ ¼ 0:7 and nð0Þ ¼ 147. Model parame-
ters: W ¼ 0:8, d ¼ 0:5, W ¼ 0:006, U ¼ 0:008. In this case the
impact of the background fitness components is very weak. The
vector field indicated by the arrows shows that the force of attraction
towards the density nullcline increases with population size.
However, the dynamics does not converge quickly to the nullcline,
and this case is far from timescale separation. Note that, the shape of
the density nullcline highly depends on the strategic composition of
the population. Thus the impact of the focal game on the population
size is strong
Fig. 3 The dynamics of a
Hawk–Dove population in our
new model with initial
conditions qhð0Þ ¼ 0:7 and
nð0Þ ¼ 147. Model parameters:
W ¼ 0:8 , d ¼ 0:5, W ¼ 0:06,
U ¼ 0:08. This case has
background fitness components
10 times larger than in Fig. 1.
The behaviour of the system and
the restpoint have changed;
however, the vector field
depicted by the arrows shows
that the system is still far from
timescale separation
Theory Biosci. (2018) 137:33–50 39
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background fitness is relatively low), the density nullcline
(as a function of qh) depends strongly on the strategic
composition. On the other hand, in the case when the focal
game is rare (as in Fig. 4), and so its impact is weak, the
density nullcline is nearly flat.
Impact of the distribution of interaction events in time
on the dynamics
In this section we will illustrate the relationships between
the dynamics-based and payoff-based approaches to the
background mortality analysed in ‘‘Two distinct approaches
to background fitness’’ and summarized by Theorem 1 in
‘‘Appendix 2’’. This will show the importance of the impact
of the distribution of events in time. In the payoff-based
approach, background deaths occur simultaneously with the
focal game event while in the dynamics-based approach they
gradually aggregate independently of the focal interactions.
We can observe this comparing the numerical simulations of
the system (12, 13) with the system (55, 56), which is the
Hawk–Dove game model derived according to (9, 10). For
simplicity we remove the background fertility from both
systems by setting W and Wb equal to zero.
Numerical simulations show that for small background
mortalities the two approaches produce similar trajectories
of strategy frequencies, but ecological predictions differ
significantly (see Figs. 5 and 6). The dynamics-based
model can predict extinction in the case when the payoff-
based model shows a positive stable population size
(Fig. 6). These numerical results support the analytical
results from Theorem 1 in ‘‘Appendix 2’’, which shows that
the stable sizes predicted by the model of Argasinski and
Broom (2012) are biased, while the frequency levels of the
intersections are the same for both approaches. With an
increase of the background mortality, the differences
between the models also increase and can affect frequency
trajectories and phase portraits (Fig. 7). Thus the above
example supports the claims that background fitness and
the background payoff are distinct, although related,
concepts.
Discussion
Two types of background fitness
Background fitness is traditionally interpreted as some
phenomenological constant (or function) added to the
payoffs of all strategies which vanishes from the continu-
ous replicator equations. This concept can be found in
many papers (for example see Cressman et al. 1986;
Houston and McNamara 1991; Claussen and Traulsen
2005), but it is treated as a technical element of the
mathematical notation and these works are not primarily
focused on the biological meaning of it. Background fitness
can be interpreted in two ways: First, as an element of the
game theoretic structure (a generalization of the back-
ground payoff from classical game theory). Second, as an
element of the dynamics occurring independently from the
focal game at a separate rate of occurrence. In the basic
Fig. 4 The dynamics of a Hawk–Dove population in our new model
with initial conditions qhð0Þ ¼ 0:7 and nð0Þ ¼ 147. Model parame-
ters: W ¼ 0:8, d ¼ 0:5, W ¼ 15, U ¼ 20. In this case the impact of
the background fitness components is very strong and the system is
close to the weak selection limit. The stable restpoint is different to
the restpoints from Figs. 2 and 3. Here the density nullcline is nearly
flat due to the weak impact of the rare focal game events. The vector
field described by the shows a strong attraction of the trajectory
towards the density nullcline, then the trajectory traces it until it
reaches the restpoint, i.e. we have effective timescale separation
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approach to evolutionary game theory, the two approaches
are indistinguishable. Some researchers, for instance those
working explicitly using discrete dynamics or weak
selection models, interpret the classical background fitness
in rather a similar way to the first approach (Broom and
Rychtar 2013; Taylor and Nowak 2006; Wu et al. 2010),
while for others, for instance in optimal foraging/ diet
choices models, the underlying logic involves the second
approach (Krˇivan 1998, 2003; Cressman and Krˇivan 2010).
However there was no rigorous formalization of this aspect
and it is rather an example of ‘‘folk’’ knowledge.
Our work shows that there are essentially two types of
background fitness (or more precisely, of background mor-
tality and fertility), the payoff-based and the dynamics-based
approaches. The dynamics-based approach that we focus on
in this paper acts as the classical background fitness and is
derived from the general ecological model, not phe-
nomenologically postulated. While the payoff-based
approach is a good tool to describe the selectively neutral
factors related to the game interaction, which is clearly
shown by the example of density dependent juvenile mor-
tality (Argasinski and Kozłowski 2008; Zhang and Hui
2011; Argasinski and Broom 2012, 2013), we have shown
here that such an application to the factors not related to the
focal game can be problematic. The payoff-based approach
does not take into account the distribution of the background
events in time. The outcomes of all background events
which occurred between two focal events affect the popu-
lation state simultaneously when a single focal event occurs,
since they are the final element of the focal game’s causal
chain. The dynamics-based background fitness is free from
this disadvantage. Note that both types of background fitness
are not selectively neutral and affect the dynamics of the
system via strategically neutral juvenile mortality (as is
shown by a Hawk-Dove example). This impact is nontrivial
and will probably affect the general stability conditions. This
is a question which is analysed in a subsequent paper (Ar-
gasinski and Broom 2017).
The event-based approach and rates of event
occurrence
The most general and important claim resulting from our
approach is that the payoff is not equivalent to the popu-
lation growth rate. Game-theoretic notions describe the
causal structure and the resulting outcomes of the specific
single interaction. The interactions aggregate with some
rate and the product of this rate with demographic out-
comes constitute the vital rates. This is different to the
approach from Taylor and Nowak (2006), where the fitness
is expressed as the outcome of the average interaction (the
sum of payoffs from interactions divided by the number of
Fig. 5 Time evolution of the Hawk frequency and population size for
the payoff-based and dynamics-based models for the parameters:
W ¼ 4, d ¼ 0:85, W ¼ 0:4. Levels of intersections indicate the
frequency coordinates of the intersections of frequency and density
nullclines ~qhðnÞ and ~nðqhÞ, constituting the rest points of the eco-
evolutionary dynamics. The frequency predictions are similar but the
trajectories of the population sizes differ significantly
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those interactions). This assumption does not take into
account the impact of the different numbers of interactions
on the fitness of the particular strategy. We can imagine an
example when one strategy will obtain on average lower
reproductive success per interaction than a competitor, but
will participate in more interactions, so that its aggregated
reproductive success is larger. The approach proposed here
explicitly takes this into account. We thus believe that the
number of games played should be explicitly considered.
Then the demographic payoffs will describe the outcomes
of the average interaction event (similarly to the stoichio-
metric coefficients in chemical kinetics, Upadhyay 2006)
not the growth rates as in traditional evolutionary games.
In static models there is no time but causal conse-
quences of the strategic ‘‘decisions’’ of individuals
described by their reproductive success. Thus, the rigorous
derivation of the population growth rate as an aggregated
outcome of individual interactions needs rates of occur-
rence as the necessary element to make the framework
consistent (the problem of the consistency and realism of
modelling frameworks was discussed in Houston and
McNamara 2005; McNamara 2013). Traditionally, inter-
action rates are not explicitly analysed in game-theoretic
selection models (some exceptions will be discussed later).
However, they can be a practical analytic tool. We can
imagine a population of individuals where the type of
games played depends upon their situation. Then the
probabilities of finding particular situations associated with
the respective type of game can be described by different
rates of occurrence. The new approach corrects intuitions
inspired by classical birth and death processes (see e.g.
Haigh 2002) where birth and death events are described by
different intensities, which implies statistical independence
of births and deaths. In this case trade-offs between mor-
tality and fertility are impossible. In evolutionary theory
benefit is linked to reproductive success while expected
cost is related to the associated mortality risk. The
approach from this paper can be used to describe the cor-
relations between mortality and fertility factors associated
with particular activities.
In addition, rates of occurrence are not necessarily
constants. For example they can be functions of the pop-
ulation size (more individuals implies potentially more
interactions per unit time) or population state. A good
example of this is the battle of the sexes with the problem
of pair formation (Mylius 1999) or dynamic model of sex
ratio evolution (see Argasinski 2012, 2013 and 2017).
There an elementary event (a Bernoulli trial) is the
Fig. 6 Time evolution of the Hawk frequency and population size for
the payoff-based and dynamics-based models for the parameters:
W ¼ 15, d ¼ 0:85, W ¼ 0:4. As in Fig. 5, the frequency trajectories
are similar but the predicted population sizes differ dramatically. The
payoff-based model predicts a positive population size at the upper
intersection. For the dynamics-based approach, the intersection
describing the Hawk invasion barrier is in the region of extinction,
since the stable population size is negative
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production of a single offspring with a randomly chosen
partner. Then females interact at a constant rate, while
males interact proportionally to the number of available
females described by the actual sex ratio (female to male).
Thus interaction rates constitute a crucial element of the
strategy selection mechanism. We can also imagine the
situation when interaction rates can depend on an indi-
vidual’s strategy. This can be illustrated by the example of
non-uniform interaction rates in the models of social
dilemmas, such as the models of upstream reciprocity
(Nowak and Roch 2007; Pena et al. 2011). In this case
there are different interaction rates for different individual
strategies within the single game.
There is also an interesting relationship between the so-
called weak selection concept and our eco-evolutionary
feedback. Traditionally, in population genetics and models
based on continuous traits, the weak selection limit
assumes very small differences between strategic agents or
alleles resulting in small selective advantage (Kimura
1968; Ohta 2002). This assumption was also used in matrix
game models, where assumption of small differences is not
necessarily applicable (for example in models with con-
trasting strategies such as Hawks and Doves which by
definition will obtain different demographic payoffs).
Then, the weak selection limit is introduced via a selection
constant (see Wild and Traulsen 2007 for the comparison
of both approaches). Note that the selection constant
(Nowak et al. 2004; Antal et al. 2009; Taylor et al. 2004;
Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Taylor et al. 2007; Fu et al. 2009;
Tarnita et al. 2009a; Wild and Traulsen 2007) can be
interpreted as the rate of the focal game’s occurrence.
Under weak selection, a focal game described by relatively
high demographic parameters will be a rare event, and its
impact on the population dynamics will be small. Our
interpretation embeds this concept in a clear biological
context. The weak selection limit can be applied only in the
case that the focal events are really rare. Thus it cannot be
applied in common types of interactions such as mating
conflicts or resource conflicts during foraging. Note that, in
the weak selection limit, where our parameter h tends to
infinity, the impact of the frequency dynamics on the
population size vanishes, but the second element of the
eco-evolutionary feedback is still present. The frequency
dynamics is affected by population size via juvenile sur-
vival inducing the nest site lottery mechanism on the
density nullcline (Argasinski and Broom 2013).
(a)
(b)
Fig. 7 Phase diagrams following the evolution of the Hawk
frequency and population size for the payoff-based and dynamics-
based models for the parameters: W ¼ 8, d ¼ 0:85, W ¼ 2:3. The
frequency and density nullclines occupy different positions with
respect to the same initial point in both cases, and the trajectories
obtained are totally different
Theory Biosci. (2018) 137:33–50 43
123
General discussion
The event-based approach constitutes a clearly defined area of
application of game-theoretic notions within the evolutionary
dynamics framework. The mathematical structure describing
the focal interaction can be very complex (e.g. see Broom and
Ruxton 1998; Gokhale and Traulsen 2010; Broom 2002;
Broom and Cannings 2002, and in general the book Broom
and Rychtar 2013) and a clear methodology how to incor-
porate the game into a population dynamic model can be
important. The approach proposed in this paper shows that
evolutionary dynamics under growth, limited by nest site
availability, is a synergistic product of different games played
by individuals, not only a simple aggregated sum of the
outcomes of those games. Thus, the dynamical approach is
more than an extension of the static game structure, as in
classical theory. An important aspect of this approach is that it
can be easily interpreted, which is a significant advantage
over abstract simplified models , as argued Geritz and Kisdi
(2012). Further, the proposed approach allows for more pre-
cise modelling of the outcomes of selection dynamics on
ecological parameters such as population size. This is very
important, because the relationship between ecological
mechanisms (regulation of the population size) and the pro-
cess of natural selection is one of the major problems of
modern evolutionary biology (Birch 1960; Hutchinson 1965;
Ginzburg 1983) and is still at the centre of debate (Pelletier
et al. 2009; Morris 2011; Post and Palkovacs 2009; Schoener
2011). We note that aspects discussed above are important
from the point of view of the general definition of fitness (see
Metz 2008; Roff 2008; Orr 2009) and its interpretation within
evolutionary theory (Mills and Beaty 1979; Rosenberg and
Williams 1986; Horan 1994; Matthen and Ariew 2002;
Brandon and Ramsey 2007; Matthen and Ariew 2009; Walsh
2010; Ramsey 2013).
The proposed approach shows how the game theoretic
notions, causal structure underlying the interactions that
shape the population dynamics, can be used within many
theoretical frameworks. It can be easily extended to
Adaptive Dynamics (Dercole and Rinaldi 2008) due to its
clear description of the underlying ecology. On the other
hand, decomposition of fitness into separate demographic
payoffs creates the possibility of incorporating more
detailed population genetic mechanisms (Crow and Kimura
1970; Hartl and Clark 1997; Bu¨rger 2000), which will
affect the fertility payoffs. Then the fertility payoff will
describe the number of mating attempts which can be
weighted by the probability of gene transfer determined by
the underlying genetic system.
In addition the impact of the proposed methodology can
be broader and more general. Note that in the case of
abstract model parameters, that are ‘‘fitted’’ to data, it can be
hard to falsify the obtained outcomes, if the model is
‘‘flexible’’ enough with respect to the ‘‘fitted’’ parameters, to
cover different types of datasets. The clear demographic
meaning of our model parameters can allow for easy falsi-
fication according to empirical data or the outcomes of
individual-based simulations (which will have the status of
in-silico experiments, see Uchman´ski and Grimm 1996;
Grimm and Railsback 2005) parameterized by the same
values. The predictions of the analytical model can be
helpful in a mechanistic explanation of the patterns pro-
duced by the simulation (see, for example, Gerlee and
Lundh 2010) or observed empirical data. This will constitute
important progression in the direction of the development of
theoretical notions related to the individual level, originated
by Łomnicki (1988), and in particular related to research on
animal personalities (Dall et al. 2004; Wolf et al. 2007;
Wolf and Weissing 2010, 2012; Wolf and McNamara 2012).
Thus, the event-based terminology not only extends the
mathematical notions, but also influences the general theory
and contributes to the understanding of the causal structure
of the evolutionary process.
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Appendix 1: The details of the general model
from Argasinski and Broom (2012)
We now briefly consider some important ideas and termi-
nology from Argasinski and Broom (2012). The main idea
underlying the modelling approach of Argasinski and
Broom (2012) is that all interactions between individuals
occur with single intensity s (there are no distinction
between different games played by the individuals) and
their outcomes are described by demographic payoff
functions, fertility W (interpreted as the number of off-
spring produced during an interaction) and mortality d
(interpreted as the probability of death during an interac-
tion). This leads the following growth equation:
_ni ¼ nis Wi  dið Þ: ð16Þ
The paper was mostly focused on the description of the
causal stages of the game interaction. In this paper we will
not analyse this aspect; thus for the objectives of the
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current paper, we do not need a complex causal structure
for our focal interaction. We will limit ourselves to a single
pre-reproductive mortality stage. Assume that it is descri-
bed for the i-th strategy by payoff functions si and single
fertility stage (when survivors reproduce) described by
payoff functions Wi. For our population, qi ¼ ni=n is the
frequency of strategy i, n ¼P ni the population size, K the
carrying capacity (maximum environmental load, Hui
2006). Since we assumed the pre-reproductive survival
stage, which implies that only survivors can reproduce, this
leads to a mortality–fertility tradeoff. Since si and Wi will
be functions of vector q (frequency dependent, as in
Framework II in Argasinski and Broom 2012) the mortal-
ity–fertility trade-off function ViðqÞ ¼
P
j qjsiðejÞWiðejÞ
should be introduced. Finally, interactions occur with rate
of occurrence s. The population for each individual strat-
egy growth equation can be formulated as follows:
_ni ¼ nisVi 1  n
K
 
 nisð1  siÞ ð17Þ
¼ nis Vi 1  n
K
 
 1  sið Þ
 
: ð18Þ
The above equation is the extended version of (16) where
WiðqÞ is replaced by 1  nK
 
ViðqÞ and diðqÞ ¼ ð1  siðqÞÞ
are game theoretic fertility and mortality payoffs. This
introduces the simple trade-off between mortality and fer-
tility. In the Eq. (17) we can remove the interaction rate s
by a change of timescale (see ‘‘Appendix 1’’ in Argasinski
and Broom 2012). Then, the above system can be rescaled
to the related frequencies. These assumptions lead to the
following detailed general system of replicator equations
(describing the changes of strategy frequencies qi)
including an equation on population size n, which will be
analysed in this paper:
_qi ¼ qi Vi 
X
j
qjVj
 !
1  n
K
 
þ si 
X
j
qjsj
 !" #
;
ð19Þ
_n ¼ n
X
i
qiVi 1  n
K
 
þ
X
i
qisi  1
 !
: ð20Þ
From the Eq. (20) we can derive the description of the n-
nullcline (which is the attractor in n-subspace):
~n ¼ K 1  1 
P
i qisiP
i qiVi
 
: ð21Þ
This nullcline consists of the equilibria of the ecological
dynamics.
Appendix 2: A comparison between the new
(dynamics-based) approach and the approach
of Argasinski and Broom (2012)
The background fitness terms derived in the ‘‘Background
fitness as the aggregated outcomes of background events’’
(dynamics-based approach) act as additive factors that
vanish from the replicator dynamics (in a similar way as in
the classical theory). However, in the classical game the-
ory, the background payoff is the neutral (additive) element
of the payoff function. Thus it is an element of the game
theoretic structure. Are background vital rates U and W
equivalent to the neutral elements of the demographic
payoff functions Wi and si? This can be shown by com-
parison of the approach (which we call here the payoff-
based approach) used in Argasinski and Broom (2012),
where all interaction events occur at the single intensity s
(there are no distinctions between different game types)
and the background fitness components are described by
phenomenological, strategically neutral elements of the
payoff functions. Neutral pre-reproductive mortality will
be represented by a multiplicative factor of the whole right-
hand side of replicator and population size equations (since
it will be the first element of the interactions causal chain);
thus it will affect only the pace of convergence. Therefore,
it can be incorporated into the occurrence rate of the focal
game sF as an adjustment. The situation is more compli-
cated with the additive element Wb þWi in the fertility
payoff and multiplicative post-reproductive mortality db ¼
1  sb affecting the survivors of the game mortality stage
sidb). This will lead to the growth equation
_ni ¼ nis Vi 1  n
K
 
 1  sið Þ þ siWb 1  n
K
 
 sidb
 
¼ nis Vi 1  n
K
 
 1 þ si Wb 1  n
K
 
þ 1  db
h i 
:
ð22Þ
Thus the selectively neutral elements appear as the multi-
plicative factor Wb 1  nK
 þ 1  db
 	
of the survival
payoffs si. This leads to the following extension of the
system (19, 20):
_qi ¼ qi Vi 
X
j
qjVj
 !
1  n
K
 "
þ Wb 1  n
K
 
þ sb
h i
si 
X
j
qjsj
 !#
;
ð23Þ
_n¼ n
X
i
qiVi 1 n
K
 
þ Wb 1 n
K
 
þ sb
h iX
i
qisi 1
 !
:
ð24Þ
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Then the density nullcline will be:
~n ¼ 1  1  sb
P
i qisi
Wb
P
i qisi þ
P
i qiVi
 
K: ð25Þ
This is system (9, 10). Thus the dynamics-based approach
from ‘‘Background fitness as the aggregated outcomes of
background events’’, based on parameters U and W, is
somewhat simpler than the original equations from
Argasinski and Broom (2012), (23) and (24). In addition, it
is clear that there is no need for a distinction between pre-
and post-reproductive mortality, because those factors are
totally independent of the focal game. Thus the classical
approach to the background fitness should be interpreted as
the aggregated outcome of other events (games) occurring
independently to the focal game, not as a phenomenolog-
ical element of the payoff function of the focal game itself.
A question arises about the relationship between the two
approaches. First, let us compare the approaches with
respect to the background fertility. In the payoff-based
approach (Argasinski and Broom 2012) this factor is rep-
resented by 1  n
K
 
Wbðsi 
P
j qjsjÞ in the frequency
equation (23) and by 1  n
K
 
Wb
P
i qisi in the population
size equation (24). Wb is multiplied by the averaged pre-
reproductive mortality related to the focal game, since it
describes a strategically neutral element of the fertility
stage of the focal game’s causal chain. In the dynamics-
based approach it is represented by 1  n
K
 
U in the pop-
ulation size equation (7) only. In the dynamics-based
approach the whole factor is represented by a single con-
stant U and is independent of the focal game. Thus the
above two approaches produce clearly distinct results.
The dynamics-based approach seems to be more natural
for the modelling of the impact of other interaction events
which occur other than through the focal game. In addition
it is technically equivalent to the approach used in classical
theory. This suggests that the background fitness is not the
same as the background payoff in classical game theory
leading to the payoff-based approach from Argasinski and
Broom (2012). Thus, both approaches are not equivalent
with respect to the cases described above. However, in the
case of post-reproductive mortality some relationship with
background mortality W can be shown.
Let us compare the general size equations using the
different approaches to the background mortality, where sb
is the neutral post-reproductive survival of the payoff-
based approach used in Argasinski and Broom (2012) and
sB is the dynamics-based approach from ‘‘Background fit-
ness as the aggregated outcomes of background events’’.
For the dynamics-based approach we have
_ni ¼ niVi 1  n
K
 
 nið1  siÞ  niW; ð26Þ
whereas the equation for the payoff-based approach was
_ni ¼ niVi 1  n
K
 
 nið1  siÞ  nisidb: ð27Þ
Thus the decay rates constituted by the mortality terms in
equations (26) and (27) are
E1 ¼ ð1  siÞ W ð28Þ
for the dynamics-based approach, and
E2 ¼ ð1  siÞ  sidb ð29Þ
for the payoff based approach. Note that equality of the
decay rates of both approaches E1 ¼ E2 implies the
condition
sidb ¼ hdB ð30Þ
which cannot be satisfied for every i; thus they are not
equivalent. Now, let us focus on the relationship between
the two approaches (distinguished by the indexes dyn for
dynamics-based approach and pf for the payoff-based
approach). We can use a Poisson process theory (Haigh
2002), to show conditions when the payoff-based approach
can be treated as an approximation of the dynamics-based
approach:
Theorem 1 Assuming that sb ¼ 1
1 þW and the population
size equilibrium condition (8) is satisfied, then
(a) The stationary frequency points for both approaches
are the same.
(b) The rate of the dynamics in the payoff-based
approach equals the rate of the dynamics-based
approach divided by 1 þW (or alternatively multi-
plied by sb).
(c) Juvenile survival probabilities Jdyn ¼ 1  ~ndynK
 
and
Jpf ¼ 1  ~npfK
 
at the stable state and respective
stable population sizes ~ndyn and ~npf are different and
Jdyn ¼ Jpf =sb leading to
~ndyn ¼ ð1  Jpf =sbÞK ¼ 1  1  sb
P
i qisi
sb
P
i qiVi
 
K:
ð31Þ
We give a proof below.
Thus, if we are only interested in the static analysis, it is
possible to approximate independent background mortality
by post-reproductive mortality db ¼ 1  sb ¼ W
1 þW
related to the game event, describing the aggregated
mortality caused by independent background events occur-
ring between two game interactions. Stable frequencies
will be the same and the respective juvenile survivals and
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population sizes can be found according to part c) of
Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 Parts (a) and (b). The replicator
equations from Argasinski and Broom (2012) using the
payoff-based approach to post-reproductive background
mortality (a special case of (23) with Wb ¼ 0) are given by
_qi ¼ qi Vi 
X
j
qjVj
 !
1  n
K
 
þ sb si 
X
j
qjsj
 !" #
;
ð32Þ
and for the density nullcline we have the following form of
juvenile survival:
1  ~n
K
¼ 1  sb
P
i qisiP
i qiVi
: ð33Þ
Using the basic properties of the Poisson process, for two
types of events happening at rates m1 and m2, the probability
that the first type event comes before the second type is
sb ¼ m1m1 þ m2. In our case the game interaction happens at
rate 1 (after the change of timescale ~t ¼ tsF) and back-
ground mortality acts at rate W ¼ hð1  sBÞ (where
h ¼ sB=sF). Then the survival probability between game
interactions is given by sb ¼ 1
1 þW since survival occurs if
a new contest comes before death. It is easy to show that
this relationship does not hold for the payoff-based
approach in general. However, under the assumption of
population size equilibrium, some relationships between
the payoff-based approach as an approximation of the
dynamics-based approach to the background mortality can
be derived. After substitution of the population size equi-
librium (33) into (32), we have
_qi ¼ qi Vi 
X
j
qjVj
 !
1  sb
P
i qisiP
i qiVi
þ sb si 
X
j
qjsj
 !" #
:
ð34Þ
After substitution of sb ¼ 1
1 þW to the above equation, we
have
_qi ¼
qi
1 þW Vi 
X
j
qjVj
 !
Wþ 1 Pi qisiP
i qiVi
þ si 
X
j
qjsj
 !" #
:
ð35Þ
The right-hand side of Eq. (35) equals a constant times the
r.h.s of Eq. (6) using the substitution from Eq. (8) (recall
that we assumed U ¼ 0 for simplicity). Thus sb only affects
the rate of convergence and intersections of the nullclines
will be the same as in the new method presented in this
paper.
Part (c). Substituting the population sizes to the logistic
suppression coefficient we can calculate the juvenile
survivals on the density nullcline. Then
Jpf ¼ 1  npf
K
 
¼ 1  sb
P
i qisiP
i qiVi
ð36Þ
for the payoff based approach, and
Jdyn ¼ 1  ndyn
K
 
¼ 1 
P
i qisi þWP
i qiVi
¼ 1=sb 
P
i qisiP
i qiVi
ð37Þ
(since W ¼ 1=sb  1Þ, for the dynamics-based approach.
Since we are especially interested in the result of the
dynamics-based approach and treat the payoff-based model as
an approximation of the dynamics based one, we need to
express the predictions of the dynamics-based model in terms of
the payoff-based approach. Thus for a given set of parameters
common to both models, we obtain from the above that
Jpf ¼ sbJdyn ð38Þ
and the stationary population size for the dynamics-based
model can be described as
~ndyn ¼ 1  Jpf
sb
 
K: ð39Þ
leading to (31). h
Appendix 3: Derivation of the Hawk–Dove
example game
The equations using the Hawk–Dove payoff functions
equivalent to the Eqs. (19) and (20), where fertility payoffs
are Vi ¼ eiS  PqTW and
P
j qjVj ¼ qS  PqTW while sur-
vival payoffs are si ¼ eiSqT and
P
j qjsj ¼ qSqT (where ‘‘’’
means elementwise multiplication and ei is the base vector
with 1 on i-th coordinate and zeros on the others), will be
the following:
_qh ¼ qh W e1S  PqT  qS  PqT
 
1  n
K
 
þ ðe1SqT  qSqTÞ
 
ð40Þ
_n ¼ n qS  PqTW 1  n
K
 
þ qSqT  1
 
: ð41Þ
The matrix operations are as follows:
e1Sq
T ¼ sqh þ 1  qh ¼ qhðs 1Þ þ 1; ð42Þ
e1S  PqT ¼ 1
2
sqh þ 1  qh; ð43Þ
qSqT ¼ qh qhðs 1Þ þ 1ð Þ þ 1  qhð Þ ¼ 1  q2hð1  sÞ;
ð44Þ
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qS  PqT ¼ qh 1
2
sqh þ 1  qh
 
þ 1
2
ð1  qhÞ2 ¼ 1
2
1  q2hð1  sÞ
 
:
ð45Þ
Note that qS  PqT ¼ qSqT=2 which simplifies (41) to
_n ¼ n qSqT 1
2
W 1  n
K
 
þ 1
 
 1
 
: ð46Þ
The bracketed terms of (40) are
Vi 
X
j
qjVj ¼ e1S  PqT  qS  PqT
 
¼ 1
2
1  qhð Þ qh s 1ð Þ þ 1Þ½ ;
ð47Þ
si 
X
j
qjsj ¼ ðe1SqT  qSqTÞ ¼ ðs 1Þqh 1  qhð Þ:
ð48Þ
After calculations and the substitution d ¼ 1  s the fol-
lowing equations for the Hawk proportion qh and for the
population size are obtained:
_qh ¼ qh 1  qhð Þ
1
2
W 1  qhdð Þ 1  n
K
 
 qhd
 
; ð49Þ
_n ¼ n 1
2
W 1  q2hd
 
1  n
K
 
 q2hd
 
: ð50Þ
Thus we have embedded the focal game into the replicator
dynamics. We should add the background fitness compo-
nents represented by the background vital rate U 1  n
K
 
W into the population size equation. Thus we obtain the
model derived according to the system (6, 7):
_qh ¼ qh 1  qhð Þ
1
2
W 1  qhdð Þ 1  n
K
 
 qhd
 
; ð51Þ
_n ¼ n Uþ 1
2
W 1  q2hd
  
1  n
K
 
 q2hd W
 
:
ð52Þ
The zeros of the right-hand sides of the above equations
will give nullclines constituting the equilibria of selection
and ecological subsystems. Two rest points of this system
are qh ¼ 0 and 1. A nontrivial rest point, which becomes
the frequency nullcline consisting of Nash equilibria, is
given by
~qhðnÞ ¼
1
2
W 1  n
K
 
d 1
2
W 1  n
K
 
þ 1
  : ð53Þ
There is a stationary population size at either ~n ¼ 0 or at
the following positive restpoint which is conditional on the
Hawk strategy frequency (describing the attracting density
nullcline parametrized by qh),
~nðqhÞ ¼ K 1  q
2
hd þW
1
2
W 1  q2hd
 þ U
 !
: ð54Þ
To obtain the model derived according to the payoff-
based background fitness we should multiply mortality
payoffs by Wb 1  nK
 þ sb
 	
as in (23) and (24). In
equations (49) this will be the last term qhd in the long
bracket, due to (48), and in Eq. (50) this will be term qSqT
in (41) which becomes 1 in the internal bracket in (46).
This leads to the model derived according to system (9, 10)
:
_qh ¼ qh 1  qhð Þ
1
2
W 1  qhdð Þ 1  n
K
 
qhd Wb 1  n
K
 
þ sb
h i
;
ð55Þ
_n ¼ n 1  q2hd
  1
2
W þWb

 
1  n
K
 
þ sb
 
 1
 
;
ð56Þ
leading to the system used in Argasinski and Broom
(2012). Then the attracting nullclines representing the
equilibria of selection dynamics and ecological dynamics
will be
~qhðnÞ ¼
1
2
W 1  n
K
 
d 1
2
W þWb
 
1  n
K
 þ sb
 
;
ð57Þ
~nðqhÞ ¼ K 1 
1  1  q2hd
 
sb
1  q2hd
 
1
2
W þWb
 	
 !
: ð58Þ
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